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Abstract—This paper addresses the problem of competition
vs. cooperation in the downlink, between base stations (BSs),
of a multiple input multiple output (MIMO) interference, het-
erogeneous wireless network (HetNet). This research presents a
scenario where a macrocell base station (MBS) and a cochannel
femtocell base station (FBS) each simultaneously serving their
own user equipment (UE), has to choose to act as individual
systems or to cooperate in coordinated multipoint transmis-
sion (CoMP). The paper employes both the theories of non-
cooperative and cooperative games in a unified procedure to
analyze the decision making process. The BSs of the competing
system are assumed to operate at the maximum expected sum rate
(MESR) correlated equilibrium (CE), which is compared against
the value of CoMP to establish the stability of the coalition. It is
proven that there exists a threshold geographical separation, dth,
between the macrocell user equipment (MUE) and FBS, under
which the region of coordination is non-empty. Theoretical results
are verified through simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Small cells are an easily deployable solution to the increas-
ing demand for capacity. Underlay small cells improve the
capacity of the network through frequency reuse and higher
link gains due to shorter distances to the user equipment
(UE). On the downside the unplanned deployment of small
cells in the larger cell structure creates unforeseen interference
conditions. Such dynamic interference situations require novel
solutions [1].
Coordinated multipoint transmission (CoMP) introduces
dynamic interaction between multiple cells to increase network
performance and reduce interference. In our research we
consider the CoMP scheme of joint transmission (JT) [2]. We
begin with the hypotheses that JT must be a rational decision,
which is profitable for both macro- and femto-systems, since
these systems may belong to independent operators/users. In
human interactions, cooperation among a group is justifiable
if all the members are better off in that group than if they
were in any other group structure among themselves. This
rational behavior is embedded in the solution concept of core
in coalition formation games.
Past research of heterogeneous networks (HetNets) of
macro- femtocells, has used both non-cooperative and coop-
erative games. In [3] a Stackelberg game is formulated where
pricing is employed to move the equilibria towards a tolerable
interference level for the macrocell base station (MBS). In
[4] a potential game based analysis of Nash equilibrium (NE)
of power and subcarrier allocation, for a multicell interfer-
ence environment is presented. In [5] power distribution over
resource blocks of cognitive femtocell base stations (FBSs)
is analyzed for their correlated equilibrium (CE). In [6], [7]
-correlated equilibrium solution is presented for underlayed
femtocells to minimize interference to the macro-system. CE
is the form of equilibrium used in this paper as well.
In [8], [9] coalition formation games with externalities are
used to group the femtocells to mitigate collisions and reduce
interference. In [10] a coalition game together with the solution
concept of recursive core is used to model the cooperative
interaction between macrocell user equipment (MUE) and
femtocell user equipment (FUE). They conclude that forming
of disjoint coalitions increases the rates of both MUE and
FUE. In [11] a coalition formation game is employed to par-
tition a dense network of femtocells to minimize interference
where they introduce a polynomial time algorithm for group
formation. In [12] both transferable utility (TU) and non-
transferable utility (NTU) coalition formation games are used
for cooperation of receivers and transmitters in an interference
environment.
This paper is set apart from the above related research,
since it brings together both theories of non-cooperative and
coalition formation games to model femto-maro interaction in
CoMP. A similar analysis but, for non-CoMP case, is presented
in [13]. The terms non-cooperative and cooperative are in
accordance to their use in the game theory literature whereas
the terms coordination, CoMP, and JT are used synonymously.
The rest of the paper consists of the system model in Section
II, game-theoretic formulation and solution in Section III,
simulation results in Section IV and conclusion with summary
in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The paper considers the downlink transmission of a two
tier HetNet, which consists of a single MBS m and a single
FBS f , separated by a distance d > 0. Each base station
(BS) has an active user equipment (UE). It is possible that the
BSs serve more than one user but the assumption is that at
any given instant each BS transmits to only one selected user.
The two BSs each possesses T number of transmit antennas
while each UE possesses R number of receive antennas. Fig.
1 depicts the system model. The origin of the plane is at MBS.
We define two modes of operation, namely uncoordinated
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Figure 1. System model. The attributes on arrows indicate the effective
distance between elements and their respective channel matrices.
and coordinated. In uncoordinated mode the two BSs act
as separate transmitters where MBS serves MUE while FBS
serves FUE. On the contrary if the two cells conform to the
coordinated mode, then the two BSs cooperate through CoMP.
The channel model includes large scale signal attenuation
as a function of distance. Channel gain matrix is multiplied
by a magnitude, which is a path loss function of distance
between BS and UE [14]. The received baseband equivalent
signal yi (resp. yj) at MUE i (resp. FUE j) for uncoordinated
transmission over Gaussian channel are
yi , d−αimHimVmsi + d−αif HifVfsj + ni, (1)
yj , d−αjf HjfVfsj + d−αjmHjmVmsi + nj , (2)
where dim, dif , djf , djm ≥ 0 are the effective distances
between the respective indexed elements, Him is the R × T
complex valued channel gain matrix from MBS m to MUE i
and Hif , Hjf , Hjm are interpreted analogously. The matrix
Vm (resp. Vf ) is the precoder at MBS (resp. FBS). The
independent symbol vector of unit variance at MBS m (resp. at
FBS m) to MUE i (resp. to FUE j) is denoted by si (resp. sj).
The exponent (−α), where α is a positive real valued scalar,
accounts for path loss, and ni, nj are circular symmetric,
uncorrelated additive withe Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors.
The achievable rate, treating interference as noise, of the
macro system, Rmuc , is given by (3) [15].
Rmuc , log det
(
IR +
d−2αim HimVmV
H
mH
H
im
d−2αif HifVfV
H
f H
H
if + σ
2IR
)
, (3)
Rfuc , log det
(
IR +
d−2αjf HjfVfV
H
f H
H
jf
d−2αjm HjmVmVHmH
H
jm + σ
2IR
)
.
(4)
Above σ2 is variance of circular symmetric noise and IR is
the R × R identity matrix. For a matrix X in the complex
field, XH denotes the Hermitian transpose. Analogously we
define the achievable rate, Rfuc, of the femto-system (4).
Now suppose that the two BSs coordinate through JT. The
coordination is such that, FBS must transmit to both UE their
respective symbols. It is possible to extend this model to
include the case where both BSs transmit to both UE. The
paper only consider MUE receiving JT since FUE are mostly
home/office users who are less mobile and they have higher
downlink gains whereas MUE may be highly mobile and
operate under high signal fading and interference. The received
signals at MUE and FUE in coordinated transmission are then
given by (5) and (6) respectively. Note matrix augmentation
in (5).
yi , d−αimHimVmsim + d−αif HifVifsif + ni, (5)
yj , d−αjf HjfVjfsj + d−αjmHjmVmsim + nj , (6)
Rfc , log det
(
IR +
d−2αjf HjfVjfV
H
jfH
H
jf
d−2αjm HjmVmVHmH
H
jm + σ
2IR
)
. (7)
Above Vif (resp. Vjf ) is the precoder matrix at FBS for
MUE (resp. FUE), Vm is the MBS precoder. The signal model
assumes that the precoders Vif and Vjf are such that there
is no interuser interference from FBS to the two UE. To that
end block diagonalization (BD) can be employed at FBS [16].
The independent unit variance transmission streams from MBS
and FBS to MUE are sim and sif . Then the achievable rates
of FUE Rfc , and MUE Rmc , for the coordinated transmission
scheme are given by (7) and (8) respectively [17]. This paper
consider that the precoders at the two BSs are chosen from
a finite predefined code-book. The finite code book model
not only affords a finite action space game, but also reflects
the systems in practical implementations such as LTE, which
define a finite code-book.
III. CORE SOLUTION
Now the paper presents two non-cooperative games one for
the uncoordinated system, G1 and one for the coordinated
system, G2. The relation between G1 and G2 is established
in the ensuing development. Both games have identical set
of players N , {MBS, FBS}, i.e., the two BSs. The action
spaces of the players are their precoder code-books. In the
uncoordinated case (resp. coordinated case) the sets of pre-
coders of MBS and FBS are denoted by Amuc and Afuc (resp.
Amc and Afc) respectively. Let 0 /∈ Afc (does not contain
zero precoder), which avoids the trivial case of non-JT. The
product sets of the action spaces are Auc , Amuc × Afuc
and Ac , Amc × Afc. The utility functions of the two
players in the uncoordinated case (resp. coordinated case) are
Rmuc and R
f
uc (resp. Rmc and R
f
c ). The joint action of G1 is
V , (Vm,Vf ) ∈ Auc where Vm ∈ Amuc and Vf ∈ Afuc
and the joint action of G2 is V ∈ Ac such that V , (Vm,Vf )
where Vm ∈ Amc and Vf ∈ Afc. Note that FBS’s action
Vf ∈ Afc, consists of two precoders Vf , (Vif ,Vjf ).
The MBS (resp. FBS) has identical maximum transmit
power in both uncoordinated and coordinated cases, i.e., for
Rmc , log det
(
IR +
d−2αim
σ2
HimVmV
H
mH
H
im +
d−2αif
σ2
HifVifV
H
ifH
H
if
)
, (8)
0 ≺ IR + d′−2αim
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
A
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2  IR + d−2αim
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
A
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
, (9)
0 ≺ IR + d−2αim A
1
2
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
A
1
2  IR + d−2αim A
1
2
(
d′−2αif B+C
)−1
A
1
2 . (10)
FBS, max
V∈Afuc
{
Trace
(
VHV
)}
= max
Vf∈Afc
{
Trace
(
VifV
H
if
)
+
Trace
(
VjfV
H
jf
)}
and analogously for MBS.
Now one possesses all the ingredients necessary to define
the non-cooperative games, G1 and G2. The uncoordinated
game is give by the tuple G1 ,
〈
N ,Auc,
{
Rmuc , R
f
uc
}〉
. The
game when the two systems are in coordination is G2 ,〈
N ,Ac,
{
Rmc , R
f
c
}〉
.
Let us set aside the above defined two games for a moment,
we come back to them shortly. To analyze the coordinated
system one must utilize coalitional games from the cooperative
game theory. The most widely used solution concept in coali-
tional games is the core. In order for the two BSs to coordinate
the core of the coalition game must be nonempty. A nonempty
core implies that the grand coalition, which includes all the
players, has a value, which is divisible among the players
so that no other partition of subsets of players can give a
better value to any of the players. The analysis of the core
requires that the cooperative game has TU, which means that
the sum utility of the coalition (the two cells in this case)
renders itself to be shared between the members. But one
observes, from the system model, that the sum rate of the
coordinated system is not arbitrarily transferable between the
two players. Therefore we follow a usual trick employed in
such situations, introduce a monitory transfer i.e., payment,
between the macro and femto systems. It is imperative to
understand that such a monitory transfer is not merely a tool
to make the problem amenable to coalitional game analysis,
but also has an important engineering and economic aspect:
coordination between the systems require sharing power with
external users and communication of symbol information
and channel state information (CSI) between the BSs. Such
transactions have to be compensated in any practical system
in order to provide an incentive to take part in CoMP. After
introducing the payment c, the utility of MBS, Umc , and FBS,
Ufc , is given by (11). The payment is of units of rate, which
can be interpreted in monitory terms as applicable.
Umc ,Rmc − c, Ufc , Rfc + c. (11)
A coalitional game in characteristic form requires a set of
players and a value function [18]. In this paper the set of
players is N , which has three nonempty subsets.
To define the value function we revisit the games G1
and G2. There are multiple definitions of equilibria for non-
cooperative games. This research is interested in CE, which is
a generalization of NE [18].
Definition 1. CE of the game G1 is a probability distribution
p˜uc (·) on the joint action space Auc such that ∀ V ∈ Auc, ∀
V′m ∈ Amuc, and ∀ V′f ∈ Afuc∑
V:Vf∈Afuc
p˜uc (V)R
m
uc (V) ≥
∑
V:Vf∈Afuc
p˜uc (V)R
m
uc (V
′
m,Vf ) ,
(12)∑
V:Vm∈Amuc
p˜uc (V)R
f
uc (V) ≥
∑
V:Vm∈Amuc
p˜uc (V)R
f
uc
(
V′f ,Vm
)
.
(13)
Similarly we define the CE of the game G2, the probability
distribution p˜c (·) on the action space Ac, which satisfies ∀
V ∈ Ac, ∀V′m ∈ Amc, and ∀V′f ∈ Afc∑
V:Vf∈Afc
p˜c (V)R
m
c (V) ≥
∑
V:Vf∈Afc
p˜c (V)R
m
c (V
′
m,Vf ) ,
(14)∑
V:Vm∈Amc
p˜c (V)R
f
c (V) ≥
∑
V:Vm∈Amc
p˜c (V)R
f
c
(
V′f ,Vm
)
.
(15)
While a finite game is guaranteed to have at least one
CE, in most cases there are an infinite set of CE [18]. Out
of this set of CE this paper choose the equilibrium, which
maximizes the expected sum rate. The maximum expected sum
rate correlated equilibrium (MESR-CE) of game G1 is the
probability distribution obtained through solving the following
linear system;
maximize
puc
∑
V∈Auc
puc (V)
(
Rmuc (V) +R
f
uc (V)
)
,
subject to (12) , (13) , (16)∑
V∈Auc
puc (V) = 1,
puc (V) ≥ 0, ∀V ∈ Auc,
where puc (V) is the probability of joint action V ∈ Auc and
puc , (puc (V))v∈Auc . The expected rate of each player at CE
of G1 is
Rmuc,cor ,
∑
V∈Auc
p˜uc (V)R
m
uc (V) , (17)
Rfuc,cor ,
∑
V∈Auc
p˜uc (V)R
f
uc (V) , (18)
where p˜uc (·) is the MESR-CE solution of the linear program
(16).
Analogously one can obtain the MESR-CE of game G2 as
the solution to the following linear system;
Rc, cor , maximize
pc
∑
V∈Ac
pc (V)
(
Rmc (V) +R
f
c (V)
)
,
subject to (14) , (15) , (19)∑
V∈Ac
pc (V) = 1,
pc (V) ≥ 0, ∀V ∈ Ac,
where pc , (pc (V))V∈Ac . Let p˜c (·) be the MESR-CE
distribution of game G2. The expected rate of each player at
CE of G2 is
Rmc,cor ,
∑
V∈Ac
p˜c (V)R
m
c (V) , (20)
Rfc,cor ,
∑
V∈Ac
p˜c (V)R
f
c (V) . (21)
Now the value function v (·) of the coalition game is as
follows;
v (S) ,

Rmuc,cor S = {MBS} ,
Rfuc, cor S = {FBS} ,
Rc, cor S = N .
(22)
At this point let us recap the development of this section so
far: in the above definition of the value function v (S), Rmuc,cor
in (17) (resp. Rfuc, cor in (18)) is the expected rate obtained
by the macro system (resp. femto system) while playing the
MESR-CE in G1. On the other hand the value of the grand
coalition, Rc, cor in (19), is the MESR of the two BSs while
playing the MESR-CE in G2. Then the coalitional game in
characteristic form is defined by the tuple G3 , 〈N , v (·)〉.
Definition 2. The core is the set of allocations such that no
subgroup within the coalition can do better by leaving to form
other coalitions [18].
In our game the set of allocations are Umc and U
f
c in (11),
such that Umc + U
f
c = Rc, cor.
A. Region of Coordination
As MUE moves closer to FBS, signal level drops and
interference level rises, hence one expects cooperation with
FBS to be preferable to MBS. Since the sum rate can be
apportioned between the two systems through the monitory
transfer, one expects to find a c, at which the core is non
empty. The region where the core is non empty is called, the
region of coordination or identically CoMP region. In a single
input single output (SISO) system a signal to interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) based argument easily demonstrates the
existence of a core but the argument for MIMO requires a bit
more analysis.
Proposition 1. v (N ) ≥ v (MBS)+v (FBS) if and only if there
exists a payment c such that Umc ≥ Rmuc,cor and Ufc ≥ Rfuc,cor.
Proof: We provide a constructive proof. By (11) and while
G2 system is in CE the utilities are Umc = R
m
c,cor−c and Ufc =
Rmc,cor + c. Let us consider the LHS of iff, which is equivalent
to Rc, cor ≥ Rmuc,cor + Rfuc,cor, which implies either Rmc,cor ≥
Rmuc,cor or R
f
c,cor ≥ Rfuc,cor or both. Let us take the case where
Rmc,cor ≥ Rmuc,cor and Rfc,cor ≤ Rfuc,cor, all other cases can be
similarly proven. Then there exists a positive constant c such
that
(
Rmc,cor − c
)
= Umc ≥ Rmuc,cor and
(
Rfc,cor + c
)
= Ufc ≥
Rfuc,cor since
(
Rmc,cor − c
)
+
(
Rfc,cor + c
)
≥ Rmuc,cor + Rfuc,cor.
Converse (RHS =⇒ LHS) is proven simply by summing the
two inequalities Umc ≥ Rmuc,cor and Ufc ≥ Rfuc,cor.
Proposition 1 claims that Rc, cor ≥ Rmuc,cor + Rmuc,cor is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the core of G3 to be
nonempty.
In order to establish the final result we need the following
propositions.
Proposition 2. Rmuc is monotonically decreasing in dim and
monotonically increasing in dif .
Proof: The proof depends on Loewner ordering of pos-
itive semidefinite (PSD) matrices ( [19] 7.7). For two PSD
matrices A, B, we write A  B (resp. A  B) if A−B  0
is PSD (resp. A − B  0 positive definite (PD)). Let
A , HimVmVHmHHim, B , HifVfVHf HHif and C , σ2IR.
A,B are PSD and C is PD, also d−2αif B+C is PD. Then the
capacity of maro-system (3) can be reformulated as
Rmuc = log det
(
IR + d
−2α
im
(
d−2αif B+C
)− 1
2 A
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
)
.
Let 0 < dim < d′im, so (9) (see page above) holds, therefore
the determinant of (24) is no less than the determinant of
(23), which implies that the determinant is monotonically
decreasing in dim.
IR + d
′−2α
im
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
A
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
. (23)
IR + d
−2α
im
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
A
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
2
. (24)
Next we reformulate (3),
Rmuc = log det
(
IR + d
−2α
im A
1
2
(
d−2αif B+C
)−1
A
1
2
)
,
and let 0 < dif < d′if . Then (10) holds and by a similar
argument to above we have that the determinant is increasing
in dif . This completes the proof.
Now we consider the properties of Rmc .
Proposition 3. Rmc (·) is monotonically increasing in d−2αif
and d−2αim and is bounded from below by
γm (dif ,Vif ) , log det
(
IR +
1
σ2
d−αif HifVifV
H
ifd
−α
if H
H
if
)
.
Proof: The proof utilizes Weyl’s inequality for Hermitian
matrices [20]. Let us first consider d−2αif .Suppose X, Y
are two Hermitian matrices of size n × n, then the Weyl’s
inequality states that
λi(X)+λn(Y) ≤ λi(X+Y) ≤ λi(X)+λ1(Y), i = 1, . . . , n,
where λi(X) is the ith largest eigenvalue of X, i.e., largest
eigenvalue is λ1 (X) and smallest is λn (X). If X, Y are
positive semidefinite (PSD) note that the inequality reduces to
0 ≤ λi(X) ≤ λi(X+Y) ≤ λi(X) + λ1(Y), i = 1, . . . , n.
Let X = IR +
d−2αim
σ2 HimVmV
H
mH
H
im +
d−2αif
σ2 HifVifV
H
ifH
H
if
and Y = δσ2HifVifV
H
ifH
H
if where δ ∈ R+. Then mono-
tonicity in d−2αif follows from
0 < det (X) =
∏
i
λi(X) ≤ det (X+Y) =
∏
i
λi(X+Y).
Similarly the proof extends to d−2αim . Then setting d
−2α
im = 0
the lower bound is achieved.
Theorem 1. For some d > 0 under Assumption 1, ∃ dth such
that for dif ≤ dth, the region of cooperation is nonempty1.
Proof: Let V = (Vif ,Vjf ) ∈ Ac, V′ ∈ Auc be any two
actions from the respective spaces and let the location of the
FUE be fixed relative to the FBS at
(
d¯jf , θ¯j
)
. Then Rfc (V)
and Rfuc (V′) are constants irrespective of location of MUE.
Now consider that MUE moves along a trajectory with de-
creasing dif and increasing dim. By Proposition 2, Rmuc (V
′) is
decreasing. As dif → 0, by Proposition 3, Rmc (dif , ·)→∞.
Therefore there must exist dif ≤ dth, such that Rmc (dif , ·) +
Rfc (V) ≥ Rmuc (V′) + Rfuc (V′). Since the action choice
was arbitrary ∃ dth such that, min
V∈Ac
(
Rmc (V) +R
f
c (V)
)
≥
max
V∈Auc
(
Rmuc (V) +R
f
uc (V)
)
.
Therefore ∀ probability distributions p˜uc and p˜c,
we have
∑
V∈Ac p˜c (V)
(
Rmc (V) +R
f
c (V)
)
≥∑
V∈Auc p˜uc (V)
(
Rmuc (V) +R
f
uc (V)
)
. This completes
the proof.
Theorem 1 together with Proposition 1 suggests the exis-
tence of a region around the FBS where the core is nonempty.
Thus we establish the rationality of CoMP scheme JT.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The distances are measured in meters (m), we locate MBS at
(0, 0), FBS at (1000, 0), and FUE (990, 0). Unless otherwise
stated, the default maximum transmit power of MBS is 5 W
and of FBS is 1 W. The two BSs each has 4 antennas and each
UE has 2 antennas. In the coordinated mode of transmission,
by default FBS distributes the power evenly among FUE and
MUE. The AWGN power is set at 10−4 W. In the Fig. 2
MUE moves from far negative x region towards the FBS in
linear trajectories. One such trajectory is shown in the figure.
1Distances are absolute values. See Fig. 1, Section II for distance notation.
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The region where coordination is preferred over uncoordinated
transmission is marked. The symmetry in the region is due to
the use of symmetric channel matrices on either side of the
FBS.
In the rest of the figures the trajectory of the MUE is on the
x axis (y coordinate is 0). Fig. 3 denotes the expansion of the
CoMP region as the FBS transmit power increases. One also
sees from the figure that Rc, cor far exceeds Ruc, cor as MUE
approaches FBS. Fig. 4 shows, on the plan of (x, y), the excess
value of the coalition over the value of uncoordinated system.
Fig. 5 demonstrates that as the amount of power allocated
to MUE increases the diameter of the coordination region
shrinks. The term diameter is loosely used to mean the distance
between the entry point and exit point of CoMP region when
the MUE’s trajectory is on x axis (y coordinate 0). Consider
the two MUE power ratios of a and c such that c > a. Then
the explanation for the phenomenon seen in Fig. 5 is that
while operating at ratio c if the FBS switches to CoMP at
the coordination boundary of the ratio a then the reduction
of FUE rate is higher than the increase in MUE rate as still
MUE is further away from FBS than FUE, thus discouraging
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the formation of the coalition till MUE moves closer to FBS.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper considered the downlink of a HetNet consisting
of a maro- and a femtocell. Two non-cooperative games were
devised. The first game, G1, had the two cells in competition.
In the second game, G2, the cells were in coordination (CoMP).
In each game the cells operated in the respective maximum
expected sum rate-correlated equilibria (MESR-CE). Then a
third game, G3, was defined which is a coalition game in
characteristic form with transferable utility. In G3 the value of
the coalition was allowed to be arbitrarily transferred between
the two cells via a payment. The solution mechanism of core,
was used in the coalitional games G3 with value function
based on MESR-CE of G1 and G2. Then the paper proved
the existence of a region where the core of the game G3
is nonempty, which demonstrates that CoMP is a rational
decision in some region and the CoMP decision making
is reduced to identifying a threshold separation dth. CoMP
decision mechanisms for more complex channel models with
more than two cells can be considered in future work.
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